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This report on liability was prepared for the Bicycle Federation of
America by Mr. John W. English, Legal Consultant. It was developed
as part of a Federal Highway Administration-sponsored research
study entitled, "Highway Route Designation Criteria for Bicycle
Routes." This one-year study, performed by the Bicycle Federation
of America, involved an extensive review of the literature related
to bicycle route selection and designation, as well as a review of
selected case studies of current practices.
The full results of this study are presented in a 320-page
Technical Report (available from the Bicycle Federation for
$40.00). This Special Report on "Liability Aspects of Bikeway
Designation· is taken from the Technical Report. Another report,
·Selecting and Designating Bicycle Routes: A Handbook,· provides
guidelines for government officials responsible for bicycle route
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Summary
This is a stucy of the potential legal liability associatec
with the designation of bikeways by government entities. It
begins with a brief introduction to basic concepts of legal
liability, inclucing tort law, negligence, duty and standard of
conduct, negligence ~ ~, proximate 9ause, contributory and
comparative negligence, assumption of risk, and governmental
immunity. Increased potential for governmental liability is
noted in the recent steacy abrogation of the protection of
governmental immunity, and in the trend toward compensation of
accident victims in ways which spread the burden to society.
The study assesses the current law regarding liability of
government entities for injuries incurred by persons using the
highways. Highway agencies have a duty to use ordinary care to
provide highways which are reasonably safe for highway users who
are themselves exercising ordinary care. This includes a duty in
maintaining the highway to inspect for defects and hazards, and
to either alleviate such hazards or give acequate warning to
highway users. In most jurisdictions, government actions
involvec in highway design anc construction are still protected
by immunity, but government actions in operating and maintaining
the highway are not.
The liability situation for bicyclists on the highway is
the same as for other highway users. Bicyclists clearly have a
right to use the highways, and the highway agency owes them the
same cuty of care. The stancard of conduct required to meet that
duty will necessarily recognize that bicycles are more
susceptible than other highway users to some hazards, and that
greater care may be requirec at some locations because the
presence of bicycle traffic there is precictable.
The study concludes that designation of bikeways will not
affect the government entity's potential liability because the
liability alreacy exists with respect to bicyclists on the
highways. Careful attention by the highway agency to compliance
with applicable laws, guicelines, and recommendec procecures
relating to the design, construction, operation, and maintenance
of bikeways will greatly curtail the risk of liability. The most
important step which any government entity can take to reduce
potential liability is to reduce accidents on its bikeways.
1
Introduction
During the preliminary stages of a project involving the
development of a handbook of guidelines for bikeway designation,
significant concerns were expressed regarding the potential legal
liability associated with designation of such bicycle facilities.
When a person using the designated bikeway is injured, will a
lawsuit and significant legal liability be the reward for the
agency which designated the route and has responsibility for it?
Concern was also expressed about the handbook itself. Could the
handbook and other guidelines like it be used as a weapon to help
establish liability in a lawsuit?
Such concerns seem legitimate. We live in an age of
substantial litigation. We regularly read of new record high
judgements being rendered in favor of injured parties. Lawyers
advertise to drum up more and more business. The wall of legal
immunity which formerly protected the government from lawsuits is
being dismantled, and what better party could there be to sue
than the government, with its virtually unlimited resources.
We can understand the concern of the government employee who
wonders whether designating bikeways will just bring a lot of
legal trouble and a drain on the public treasury. But are such
concerns reasonably based upon a thorough understanding of the
liability problem, or are they simply unsubstantiated fears. If
there is a serious problem with legal liability, what can be done
about it. The purpose of this paper is to address these
questions. The paper raises the following three issues:
1. How does designation of a bikeway affect the potential
liability of the governmental entity which controls the facility?
2. What impact do the various laws, regulations, guidelines,
and standards relating to bikeways have on the government
entity's potential liability?
3. What can the government entity do to reduce the potential
liability related to bikeway designation?
We will first explore the dimensions of the legal liability
problem, and then we will provide some answers for these
questions and for the concerns of would-be bikeway designators.
2
A Primer on Legal Liability
Tort Law
For readers who are not lawyers, a brief introduction to
legal liability, and especially to tort law, may be helpful.
Those who already understand these concepts may wish to skip this
section.
Where one party causes injury to another, our legal system
generally provides a remedy intended to restore a proper balance
of justice between the two. Depending upon the kind of law
involved, the remedy may involve punishment of the wrongdoer,
compensation of the injured party, a court order to the wrongdoer
to stop doing the harm, or a combination of such remedies. In
many cases, the remedy is provided by the system of law known as
tort law.
Tort law is part of the civil law, as distinct from the
criminal law. Civil law is concerned with the individual rights
of the parties involved in a case. Criminal law, on the other
hand, is concerned with the rights of the public as well as the
rights of the accused ·wrongdoer. In a criminal law case, the
public, represented by the government, is the injured party.
Tort law is also distinct from contract law. In a contract
law case, the parties have made an agreement which affects their
rights and duties toward each other. The injured party has
suffered because the wrongdoer has failed to comply with the
terms of the contract. In a tort law case, however, the rights
and duties of the parties are established by law rather than by
the terms of a contract.
Tort law is that body of law which is concerned with
providing a remedy for a particular injured party, rather than
for the public, in cases where the injured party does not rely
upon rights and duties specified in a contract as the basis for
seeking a remedy.l
1. ~ generally Keeton § 1 (1984).
3
The most common remedy afforded in tort law cases is a
judicial judgement holding the defendant, the wrongdoer, liable
to compensate the plaintiff, the injured party, for the monetary
value of the plaintiff's injuries. This would be called a
judgement of tort liability.
Negligence
There are many different kinds of wrongdoing covered by tort
law including assault, battery, trespass, libel, slander,
nuisance, misrepresentation, and negligence, among others.
Negligence is the most common kind of tort, and the only kind
which will be discussed in this paper.
Negligence
harm to others.
the plaintiff in
elements must be
is conduct which creates an unreasonable risk of
In order for a defendant to be held liable to
a negligence action, each of the following four
shown: 2
1. It must be shown that the defendant had a duty to conform
to a particular standard of conduct for the protection of the
plaintiff against unreasonable risk. In determining what risks
are unreasonable, the courts will generally balance the magnitude
and probabili ty of the harm a'gainst the social val ue of the
conduct which created the risk and the burden of protecting
against it.3
The standard of conduct to which the defendant must conform
is called the "reasonable person" standard. This simply means
that the defendant is required to do what a reasonable person
would do under the same circumstances. The courts will consider
the customary conduct of other persons in like circumstances as
evidence of the standard of conduct which should be applied to a
particular case. 4
2. ~ generally Keeton § 30 (1984).
3. ~ generally Keeton § 31 (1984).
4. ~ generally Keeton §§ 32, 33 (1984).
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If the conduct which is alleged to have been negligent is
the kind of activity which requires some special knowledge or
skill, and if the defendant is a person who possesses such
special knowledge or skill, a higher standard of conduct will be
imposed. An engineer, for example, may be required to exercise
the knowledge and skill of a reasonable and competent engineer in
dealing with an engineering problem.5
In some cases, a law, ordinance, or regulation has been
enacted to establish what reasonable people shall do. Where, for
example, a law has been passed to protect people like the
plaintiff, that law constitutes the applicable standard of
conduct, and a reasonable person will not violate it. A
violation by the defendant which causes the kind of injury to the
plaintiff which the law was intended to prevent will be
considered negligence~~ (in itself).6
Guidelines or standards which are not laws but which reflect
the customary or recommended practice in a particular area of
conduct may be considered by some courts as evidence of the
standard of conduct which should be required in a particular
case. 7
2. It must be shown that the defendant breached the duty
owed to the plaintiff by failing to conform to the required
standard of conduct. These first two elements, the existence of
a duty and the breach of that duty, constitute negligence, but
the negligence is not "actionable," that is, it cannot result in
liability, unless the next two elements are also shown.
3. It must be shown that the plaintiff suffered some 1nJury
or damage due to the defendant's conduct. The plaintiff's injury
may be in the form of property damage, monetary loss such as lost
wages, bodily injury, death, pain and suffering, and mental
anguish, or a combination of these. The term "damages" refers to
the monetary value of the plaintiff's injury.
5. ~ generally Keeton § 32 (1984).
6. ~ generally Keeton § 36 (1984).
7. ~ generally Keeton § 33 (1984).
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4. It must be shown that there was a reasonable causal
connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's
injury. This element is called proximate causation. A negligent
defendant will be held liable to the plaintiff only if the
negligence is found to be a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury.
At the very least, the doctrine of proximate causation
requires what lawyers call but-for causation. The defendant's
negligence is considered to have caused the plaintiff's injury if
the injury would not have occurred but for the negligence. To
put it the other way around, if the plaintiff would have been
injured even without the defendant's negligence, then the
negligence is not a cause of the injury.B
The doctrine of proximate cause requires more than a showing
of but-for causation, however. Every accident has many but-for
causes, but most are too remote or insignif icant to serve as a
just basis for the imposition of liability. The consequences of
all of our actions go on to eternity, but at some point our
responsibility for those consequences must be curtailed. This is
the purpose of the proximate cause doctrine. The doctrine
embraces all those considerations of justice, common sense, and
sound public policy which determine whether, in a particular
case, the defendant's negligence was such a cause of the
plaintiff's injury that the defendant should be required to
provide compensation. Issues which are typically addressed in
this consideration include the nearness of the cause, the
significance of the cause compared with other causes, whether the
results were reasonably foreseeable, and whether some other
significant cause intervened between the negligence and the
injury.9
B. ~ generally Keeton § 41 (1984).
9. ~ generally Keeton §§ 42, 43, 44 (1984).
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A 1983 Florida bicycle case provides an excellent discussion
of the proximate cause issue. lO A l3-year old child was riding a
bicycle on an asphalt bicycle path which was separated from an
adjacent roadway by a five-foot wide grass strip. The path had
not received maintenance in the nine years since it was
constructed, and was very bumpy in places due to tree roots
growing underneath. In order to avoid a bumpy location, the
child rode onto the grass str ip and then into the roadway because
there were trees in the grass strip. The child was struck and
killed by an oncoming car on the roadway. The county asserted
that its alleged negligent failure to maintain the path was not a
proximate cause of the child's death. The trial court agreed and
granted judgement for the defendant, without letting the issue be
decided by the jury. The appeals court noted that the failure to
maintain the path was clearly a but-for cause of the accident,
but that the child's action in riding into the roadway and the
action of the approaching motorist could be considered
intervening causes. The court held that if the intervening
causes and the harm which resulted were reasonably foreseeable,
then the failure to maintain the path could be a proximate cause
of the child's death. The issue of reasonable foreseeability
presented genuine issues of fact which should have been submitted
to the jury. The case was remanded for a new trial.
Defenses
The defendant in a negligence action can assert certain
aff irma ti ve def enses in order to avoid all or some of the
liability. The principal defenses are contributory negligence
and assumption of risk.
Contributory negligence is negligence on the part of the
plaintiff which is a proximate cause of the plaintiff's own
injuries. It is conduct which creates an unreasonable risk of
harm to the self. Contributory negligence is governed by the
same criteria as negligence. The same four elements must be
shown. lI
10. Stahl v. Metropolitan Dade County (Fla. 1983).
11. .s..e..e. generally Keeton § 65 (1984).
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The rule for many years was that a plaintiff who was
contributorily negligent was unable to recover compensation for
any injuries. This was generally true even if the defenaant's
negligence was very great ana the plaintiff's contributory
negligence was relatively minor. A number of legal doctrines
developed to avoid the harshness of this rule, the most important
being the doctrine of last clear chance. Under this doctrine,
the contributorily negligent plaintiff coula still recover
damages if it were shown that the defendant had the last clear
chance to avoid the accident. This doctrine is considerably less
important today because of the abrogation of the contributory
negligence rule in most states, but the doctrine remains viable
in the states which have retained the contributory negligence
rule ana even in a few states which have adopted comparative
negligence. 12
The great majority of states no longer prohibit any recovery
by a contributorily negligent plaintiff. Instead, they have
aaoptea some form of comparative negligence under which the
damages suffered are apportioned according to the negligence
attributed to each party. For example, if the jury determines
that the plaintiff's negligence was 25 percent responsible, and
the defendant's negligence was 75 percent responsible, then the
plaintiff will be able to recover 75 percent of the damages.
Many states still bar recovery if the plaintiff's negligence is
equal to or greater than the defenaant's.13
Assumption of risk is another affirmative defense which is
similar to and often confused with contributory negligence.
Actually, assumption of the risk mayor may not involve
contributorily negligent conduct, depending upon the
circumstances. A plaintiff who, with full awareness of the risk
which has already been created by the defendant's negligence,
voluntarily proceeds to encounter it is said to assume the risk.
If the plaintiff suffers injuries as a result of the risk which
12. ~ generally Keeton § 66 (1984).
13. ~ generally Keeton § 67 (1984).
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was assumed, the defendant will not be liable. Note that the
defendant may be liable for negligence which creates a new or
different risk for the plaintiff. The defendant's duty to act
with due care to avoid creating a new and unknown unreasonable
risk for the plaintiff is not waived. Assumption of the risk
waives only the defendant's duty in regard to the risk which has
already been created and of which the plaintiff has full
knowledge. 14
opposition to the assumption of risk defense has been
growing, especially with the introduction of comparative
negligence. Many states have now abolished or severely limited
the defense.
Immunity
For reasons of social policy, some defendants are immune
from liability for their torts. Under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, for example, a sovereign government entity cannot be
sued for tort liability, unless it first gives its permission.
In the absence of permission, the immunity is absolute.
Various explanations have been offered in support of the
sovereign immunity doctrine. Some suggest that it would be
inconsistent to permit a claim founded in law to be brought
against the very sovereign power which creates and sustains the
law. Others suggest that government simply will not work
effectively if it must work with the threat of a lawsuit hanging
over every decision. Yet another rationale is that jUdicial
scrutiny of the actions of government in a tort liability suit
would interfere with the separation of powers concept which is
such an integral part of our government structure. For whatever
reason, the sovereign immunity concept has been around as long as
the nation.1S
14. ~ generally Keeton § 68 (1984).
IS. ~ generally Keeton § 131 (1984).
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The term "sovereign immunity" normally refers strictly to
the immunity of the national and state governments, but a broader
doctrine of governmental immunity extends to some other
governmental or quasi-governmental entities, including county and
town governments, municipal corporations, and government
officials. In some states the immunity law applicable to each of
these specific entities of government differs significantly. In
spite of that, we will use the term "governmental immunity" to
refer broadly to this whole area of law, including sovereign
immunity.16
The law of governmental immunity has changed dramatically in
the last few decades in several ways. First, the immunity of
government has been significantly reduced either through
abrogation of the immunity doctrine or through legislation which
gives the government's permission for some or all lawsuits.
Second, the law, which was formerly almost entirely case law
(written judicial decisions), has taken on a significant
statutory law (enacted by the legislature) element. The federal
government and nearly all of the states now have some statutory
law relevant to the matter of governmental immunity.17
In spite of these changes, the general rule remains that one
can sue the government for a tort only under terms and conditions
specified by the government. The following three important
patterns of immunity have relevance for this paper and will be
discussed in greater detail later:
1. Many governmental entities are liable in tort for
ministerial functions performed by government employees, but
remain absolutely immune for discretionary functions. This
distinction in functions developed in the case law, became part
16. ~ generally Keeton §§ 131, 132 (1984).
17. ~ generally Shepard's (1982).
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of the Federal Tort Claims Act, and is now part of the statutory
or case law of many of the states. It is the most commonly
applied test of immunity.18
2. Some governmental entities, especially municipal
corporations, are liable in tort for acts which are performed as
part of a proprietary function but remain immune as to acts which
are part of a governmental function. This distinction developed
in municipal law. Its rationale is that municipal corporation$
perform some governmental functions and should enjoy the same
immunity as the state for these functions, but municipalities
also perform many functions similar to those performed by private
business entities and should not be immune in regard to those.19
3. Some governmental entities, especially highway
departments in some states, are generally immune from liability,
but are subject to liability for highway defects which cause
injury. The details of this liability are specified in the
statutes of the states.
Final Comment on Liability -- Compensation
Recent years have shown considerable evidence of a changing
attitude regarding tort liability and the need for victim
compensation. As we noted above, government immunity has been
greatly curt~iled, allo~ing many successful suits against
governmental entities which would not-have be.en permitted in
earlier years. The harshness of the contributory negligence rule
has been widely abated by the adoption of some form of
comparative negligence. The adoption of no-fault automobile
accident compensation programs and compulsory automobile
18. ~ generally Shepard's §§ 2.45 to 2.50 (1982).
19. ~ generally Shepard's §§ 2.36 to 2.44 (1982).
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liability insurance prograffis in many states are yet further
examples of this trend toward compensating victims. Clearly our
legal system is seeking to find sources of compensation for
injured persons so that the burden of the injury is borne by
those most able to pay, and ultimately by society as a whole
rather than by the accident victim alone.20
The significance of this trend for government agencies which
maintain facilities for bicycle travel should be very obvious.
Potential legal liability is a factor which cannot be ignored.
20. ~ generally Keeton §§ 4, 82, 83, 84, 85 (1984).
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Liability Relating to Highways
There have been few appellate court cases specifically
dealing with liability to persons injured while using a bikeway.
There are many cases, however, which involve liability to persons
injured while using the highways. Most of what we can learn
about bikeway liability will come from an analysis of these
highway liability cases.
While most of the highway liability cases involve motorists,
many involve pedestrians, and some involve bicyclists operating
on the roadway, shoulder, or sidewalk. The issues treated in
these cases are identical to, or closely parallel, the issues
presented by a bikeway liability case. This is true because most
bikeways are designated as a part of an existing highway. In
other cases, the bicycle facility may itself constitute a
highway, depending upon how the term "highway" is defined in the
applicable law. Even if a bikeway is not a highway, they are
still sufficiently analogous that any liability issues are very
similar. Highways and bikeways are both public ways for
vehicular traffic.
Therefore, if we are to understand how the designation of a
facility for bicycle travel affects liability of the designating
agency, we need first to understand highway liability. We need
to assess the liability of highway agencies for injuries to
highway users in general. More specifically, we need to assess
the liability for injuries to bicyclists who are operating on
highways which have not been specifically designated as bikeways.
That is the purpose of this section of the paper.
Two of the legal concepts discussed in the previous section
will play an extensive role in this analysis. First, the
question of duty will be critical. Does the highway agency have
a duty toward the highway user generally? What about the
bicyclist highway user? If there is a duty, to what standard of
conduct must the agency conform, and what will this require in
terms of highway design, planning, construction, operation, and
maintenance activities? Second, since the agencies which concern
us are virtually always government entities, to what extent does
government immunity shield them from liability?
13
The analysis will be facilitated by splitting the highway
agency's functions into two categories, a design category which
encompasses all design, planning, and construction activities,
and a maintenance category which includes maintenance and
operational functions. Liability for each of these categories
can vary significantly.
Highway Design
This is the area which is least likely to produce liability,
primarily because governmental immunity often shields this
activity. Nevertheless, there are many cases where government
entities have been held liable for injuries to highway users
which result from defective highway design.21 We will first
consider the standard of conduct applicable to highway design,
and then the immunity which often applies to design functions.
Standard of Conduct
It is generally held that highway agencies have a duty to
exercise ordinary or reasonable care in highway planning and
designing. The government has a duty to construct highways which
are reasonably safe, but the government is not an insurer of the
safety of highway users. Highways should be safe for persons who
are themselves exercising reasonable care in their use.22 Where a
highway is designed in accordance with generally accepted
engineering practices and standards existing at the time, this
will satisfy the government's duty of reasonable care. This is
true even if prevailing engineering standards have changed since
the highway was designed. 23
21. See,~ the cases listed at 45 ALR3d 875, §§ 10(a),
ll(a), l2(a), 13, l4(a), l5(a), and 16.
22. ~ generally 45 ALR3d 875 at 892.
23. .I..d at 893-4: NCHRP, .R.R.I2 .l.2..2. at 10-11 (1981).
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On the other hand, where circumstances have changed in such
a way that the highway has become hazardous in actual operation,
the government cannot ignore the hazard on the grounds that the
highway was designed according to the prevailing standards of its
time. The government has a continuing duty to review a design in
light of actual operation and changed circumstances, and if it
appears that the design has become hazardous, the government must
act reasonably to correct or alleviate the hazard, or to give
adequate warning of its presence. 24
Thus, in a 1945 bicycle case in which a child was killed on
a bicycle which fell off a br idge which had no side rail, the
court ruled that traffic conditions had radically changed in the
27 years since the bridge was built. Due to the increase in
traffic, the state had a duty to erect a railing on the bridge.
Having failed to do so, it was liable for the death.25 A more
recent case involved a pedestrian injured on a bridge which had
been designed with an incomplete sidewalk system in contemplation
that the bridge would carry only limited pedestrian traffic. The
court held that the state was under a continuing duty to review
its plan in light of actual operation after the bridge was
constructed. Had the state fulfilled this obligation, it would
have discovered that pedestrian use of the bridge was frequent
and regular, and that the sidewalk system was inadequate and
unsafe. The state should have erected sign or barriers to warn
of the dangers. Having failed to do so, the state was liable.26
As evidence of the standard of conduct which should apply to
highway design, many courts admit published documents, such as
safety codes, standards, or guidelines, which are sponsored or
issued by government agencies or voluntary associations, even
24. Breed v. Shaner (Hawaii 1979); Baldwin v. State (Cal.
1972); NCHRP, RRD..B...O.. at 30-31 (1975); NCHRP, IUm l...4..l at 8-9
(1983). ~~ the dictum (a statement in a judicial opinion
which is not necessary to the decision) in Weiss YL~ (N.Y.
1960) at 67.
25. Garrow v. State (N.Y. 1945).
26. Sanford v. State (N.Y. 1983).
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though such documents lack the force and effect of law. The
documents are accepted as being objective, reliable, and
representing a consensus of opinion on the sUbject. Other courts
reject this kind of evidence (under the "hearsay" evidence rule)
because it merely represents the opinions of its authors who are
not present in court and thus not subject to cross examination.27
Sometimes a statute or regulation defines or contributes to
definition of the standard of conduct applicable to the design of
a highway. If relevant, these laws would always be admissible.
As we noted earlier, if a law is passed which protects the
plaintiff from a particular harm, a violation of that law which
causes that harm to the plaintiff will be considered negligence
~~. The potential significance of this matter should not be
underestimated.
There are~ different federal and state laws and
regulations which are relevant to the matter of highway design.
Often the provisions of these laws are only permissive or
advisory. These provisions would be taken as evidence of the
appropriate standard of conduct, much like the documents which
lack the force and effect of law discussed above. But many of
the provisions of these laws are mandatory. These provisions may
provide the basis for a finding of negligence ~ ~.28
Consider, for example, the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control
Devices (MUTCD). The MUTCD is developed by the Federal Highway
Administration, with the cooperation of the National Advisory
Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (a private voluntary
association), as a national standard.29 Further, almost all of
27. For two excellent papers exploring this matter in detail, see
58 ALR3d 148 and NCHRP, mm l..2..2. (1981).
28. ~ generally NCHRP, BEn llQ at 10-12 (1979).
29. FHWA, MUTeD (1978). The MUTCD has been approved by the
Federal Highway Administrator as the national standard for all
highways and bicycle trails open to pUblic travel in accordance
with 23 U.S.C. §§ 109(d) and 402(a) (1983) 1 .s..e...e. 23 CFR 655.603
(1985)1 the MUTCD is also incorporated by reference at 23 CFR
625.3 (1985).
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the states have statutes which adopt the manual by reference as
the state standard, or which require the state highway department
to adopt the manual. 30 As a result of these federal and state
laws, the MUTCD has, to some extent, the force and effect of law
in every state. At least one court has already ruled that a
violation of the MUTCD constitutes negligence ~ ~.3l There are
many other cases in which the MUTCD has been used as evidence of
the appropriate standard of conduct.32
Governmental Immunity
As noted above, highway design functions are often shielded
from liability by some form of governmental immunity. The status
of the law of governmental immunity varies greatly in each state.
We will identify certain patterns of immunity which are commonly
found in the law, and assess liability for highway design in
terms of each pattern.
Discretionary Function Immunity
The most common pattern in governmental immunity is the
distinction between discretionary functions, which are protected
by immunity, and ministerial functions, which are not.
Discretionary functions involve the exercise of independent
judgement, often in a policy-making role. Ministerial functions
are guided by established policy and permit a minimum of
independent judgement.33
30. These state laws are collected in NCUTLO, TLA § 15-104 (1979,
Supp. 19~3).
31. Jorstad v. City of Lewiston (Idaho 1969).
32. State v. Watson (Ariz. 1967); other cases are gathered and
discussed in NCHRP, BEn l2i (1981) and NCHRP, BEn 1lQ (1979).
33. ~ generally NCHRP, BEn BQ at 22-27 (1975).
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This distinction developed in the law of immunity of pUblic
officials. Courts seeking to trim the absolute immunity formerly
enjoyed by government entities extended the distinction to the
law of governmental immunity. In 1946 it became part of the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and thereafter it was
incorporated into the tort claims acts or other relevant
statutory law of many states.34 It also continues to be widely
used in the jUdicial case law of states which have not made it
part of their statutory law.35
The statutory provision which is typical follows the
language of the FTCA, combining the discretionary function
immunity with an immunity for functions relating to the execution
of laws and regulations. The Iowa law, for example, provides
that the state retains immunity with respect to:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee
of the state, exercising due care, in the execution of
a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or
regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
34. FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1983). See,~, Alaska Stat.
§ 09.50.250 (1) (1982) (re state immuni ty), and § 09.65.070 (d) (2)
(1982) (re municipal immunity) J ,Arizona Rev. Stat. § 12-820.01
(1982) (the law covers both state and municipal immunity; it
defines "discretionary function" in terms of "fundamental
government policY")J Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 662-2, -15 (1976)J
Idaho Code §§ 6-903, -904 (1979, Supp. 1985)J Indiana Stat. Ann.
§ 34-4-16.5-3 (Supp. 1984) J Iowa Code Ann. § 25A.14 (1978, Supp.
1985)(state immunity), and § 613A.4 (Supp. 1985)(municipal
immuni ty) J Kansas Stat. Ann. § 75-6104 (d) (Supp. 1983).
35. Shepard's §§ 2.45 to 2.50 (1982).
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discretionary function or duty on the part of a state
agency or an employee of the state, whether or not the
discretion be abused.36
Recognizing that all human activity involves the exercise of
some discretion, the courts have narrowed the concept of
discretionary functions to encompass only those activities which
involve considerations of public policy. Where there is room for
a policy judgement, the activity involves a discretionary
function. 37
In a further narrowing, the courts have developed what is
called the nope rational-planning leveln test of discretionary
functions. The gravamen of this test is how high-up in the
government structure the decision was made. If the decision was
made at the planning level of government, the level where policy
decisions are generally made, it is probably a discretionary
function. Once the planning decision has been made, however,
decisions involved in execution of the plan at the operational
level are ministerial.38 On the other hand, the fact that a
decision is made at a relatively high level of government will
not alone cause it to be considered a discretionary function. It
is also important whether the decision makes policy or simply
36. Iowa Code Ann. § 25A.14 (1978, Supp. 1985). For an excellent
discussion of the discretionary function immunity doctrine in
regard to highway design, construction, and maintenance, with
particular reference to the Iowa statute, see Bennett and Sather
(1969) •
37. Dalehite v. United States (1953); Shepard's § 2.46 (1982);
NCHRP, .R.R.O ..8...0. at 23 - 25 (1975).
38. Indian Towing Co. V. United States (1955); Shepard's § 2.47
(1982); NCHRP, .R.R.O..8...0. at 25-26 (1975).
19
follows existing policies or standards. The courts recognize
that even high-level officials can make operational-level
decisions. 39
In determining whether a discretionary function is involved,
many courts look to the separation of powers concept which is the
basis for the immunity. Government agency decisions which weigh
competing interests and alternative courses of action, and which
involve a conscious balancing of risks and advantages in
determining how the pUblic interest can best be served with th~
available resources are considered discretionary functions. These
are precisely the kind of decisions which are committed to the
executive and legislative branches of government, and the courts
cannot substitute their judgement in place of that of the
coordinate branch of government. 40
The effect of all this on highway design is generally to
provide immunity. Both the decision to construct or reconstruct
a highway and the approval of the highway design are usually
considered to be high-level exercises of policy jUdgement which
constitute discretionary functions. 41
One of the leading cases is Weiss ~~, wherein the issue
was the reasonableness of the clearance interval in a traffic
light system. The clearance interval had been approved by the
responsible board after appropriate engineering and traffic
investigations. The court held this was a planning level
39. Griffin v. United States (3d Cir. 1974); Costa v. Josey (N.J.
1980); Stevenson v. State Department of Transportation (Ore.
1980); Baran v. City of Chicago Heights (Ill. 1968). ~ AlaQ
Keeton § 131 (1984).
40. Butler v. State (Iowa 1983); Costa v. Josey (N.J. 1980);
Baldwin v. State (Cal. 1972); State v. Abbott (Alaska 1972);
Johnson v. State (Cal. 1968). ~ AlaQ the four-part test of
discretionary functions set forth in Evangelical United Brethren
Church .Y..... State (Wash. 1965).
41 • .s..e.e. 45 ALR3d 875 at 885; NCHRP, .RED...8..Q. at 27 (1975).
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decision involving the exercise of discretion, and protected by
immunity. To hold otherwise, the court observed, would be to
submit to the discretion of an untrained jury a matter which the
legislature had entrusted to experts in the government. 42
This design immunity is not absolute, however. Where the
design is obviously or inherently dangerous or defective, the
courts have not attached immunity.43 If the government acted to
approve the design in an arbitrary or capricious manner, or if
the design was so clearly defective that no reasonable person
could have approved it, then the approval is not immune from
judicial scrutiny.44 The purpose of the immunity is to allow the
government entity to govern, that is, to make choices between
reasonable alternatives as to pUblic policy. It is not the
purpose of the immunity to allow the government entity to act
arbitrarily, unreasonably, and irresponsibly.
Note that it is the approval of the highway design, rather
than the actual designing of the highway, which is considered a
discretionary function. Where the design has not been approved
by the appropriate governing body or administrative agency, or at
very least by a higher-level employee exercising policy-making
authority, the courts have held that the design is not immune. 45
This is consistent with the decisions discussed above which
require policy judgement to be exercised before immunity will
attach. There are many decisions made in highway design which do
not involve policy judgement. 46 Immunity for highway design
under the discretionary function test is grounded in the approval
of the design by a policy-level body or employee, and not in the
complex jUdgements made by the design engineer.
42. Weiss v. Fote (N.Y. 1960).
43. ~ 45 ALR3d 887-89.
44. Sanford v. State (N.Y. 1983): Hall v. State (N.Y. 1981).
45. ~ 45 ALR3d 875 at 889-90.
46. Stevenson v. State Department of Transportation (Ore. 1980):
Shepard's § 2.46 (1982).
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In order for design immunity to attach, it is also important
that discretion was actually exercised in regard to the
governmental action which is alleged to be negligent. Some
courts require a showing that a policy-level official or body,
faced with alternative approaches, weighed the competing policy
considerations and made a conscious choice. 47 Similarly, courts
have held that there is no design immunity unless the particular
aspect of the design which caused the accident was specifically
considered and approved. Thus, in a case where the uneven
superelevation (banking) of a curve caused an accident, the court
held that there was no design immunity because the original
plans, as approved, contained no specifications for the
superelevation of the roadway.48
It is also clear that design immunity is not perpetual. As
we noted in the discussion of duty, the government has a
continuing duty to review its design in light of actual operation
and changed circumstances. If the design is shown by experience
to be hazardous or has become hazardous due to changing
conditions, the government must take reasonable steps to
alleviate the hazard or to give warning of its presence. In
Baldwin YL State, a high-speed highway was designed without a
left-turn lane at a particular intersection because there was
virtually no left-turning traffic. The court held that when
later development in the area and changing traffic conditions
resulted in a significant increase in left-turning traffic and a
large number of accidents, the state was obligated to either
construct a left-turn lane or prohibit left turns to alleviate
the hazard. 49
47. Costa v. Josey (N.J. 1980); Johnson v. State (Cal. 1968).
48. Cameron v. State (Cal. 1972) • .s..e..e also, Anderson v. City of
Thousand Oaks (Cal. 1976).
49. Baldwin v. State (Cal. 1972) • .s..e..e also, Wyke v. Ward (Pa.
1984); Sanford v. State (Cal. 1983). The Idaho Supreme Court,
however, has reached the opposite conclusion, deciding that its
design immunity statute was intended to provide perpetual
immunity. see Leliefeld v. Johnson (Idaho 1983).
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The concept of immunity for approved highway designs has
been incorporated into statutory law in many states. These laws
are discussed below under the heading, Design Immunity statutes.
Governmental Function Immunity
Another common pattern of governmental immunity is the
distinction between governmental functions, which are protecteo
by immunity, and proprietary functions, which are not immune.
Governmental functions are activities which are uniquely
governmental in their nature in the sense that only the
government can effectively accomplish their purpose. They are
the kind of functions for which government is created.
Proprietary functions, on the other hand, are those which could
just as well be carried on by a private entity.50
This distinction developed in the law of municipal
corporations and it still has its greatest impact there, although
it has found some application to state government.51 Sovereign
immunity originally applied only to the state governments.
Municipal corporations were created by the state government, but
were separate entities, just like other corporations. It was not
immediately clear that they should enjoy the same immunity from
suit as the state. Municipalities performed some governmental
functions, just like the state, but also performed some
nongovernmental functions. Ultimately the courts extended the
states' immunity to cover the municipalities' governmental
functions, but not its other functions, which came to be known as
proprietary functions.
50. ~ generally NCHRP, RRE BQ at 19-21 (1975).
51. ~ 40 ALR2d 927; also, the Michigan tort claims statute
incorporates the governmental function doctrine. ~ Mich. Stat.
Ann. §§ 3.996 (107), 3.996 (113) (Supp. 1985). For further
analysis of the Michigan governmental function immunity doctrine,
see Collins (1982).
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Distinguishing governmental and proprietary functions has
been an onerous task for the courts, and one which has not led to
any satisfactory conclusion. There are many incongruous and
confusing decisions. The same task is labeled governmental in
one jurisdiction and proprietary in another. The U.S. Supreme
Court has called the distinction a "quagmire" and an "inherently
unsound" rule of law.52 Some courts have simply abrogated the
immunity rather than to continue to try to reconcile their
decisions under the distinction.53
Tests which are used by the courts in distinguishing
governmental and proprietary functions include whether the
activity can only be done by a government entity or can also be
done by a private entity, whether the activity is necessary in
order for the government to execute a duty imposed by statute or
constitution, whether the activity is undertaken for the common
good of all, and whether a charge is imposed on those who benef i t
from the activity.54
Is the governmental function immunity doctrine simply a
different way of expressing the discretionary function immunity
doctrine? Clearly it is not, but there are cases in which the
two doctrines are mixed and confused. How do they differ? The
principal difference is that the governmental function doctrine
looks at the overall function of which the activity is part in
order to determine whether immunity applies. The discretionary
function doctrine looks specifically at the activity which is
alleged to be negligent. For example, if highway construction is
deemed to be a governmental function, then all aspects of that
operation are immune, !rom the decision by the road commission to
build the highway all the way down to the activities of the
52. Indian Towing Co. v. United States (1955) at 65.
53. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach (Fla. 1957).
54. .s...e..e. 60 ALR2d 1198 at 1203, Shepard's §§ 2.37 to 2.40 (1982).
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construction crew. with the discretionary function doctrine,
however, only those aspects of the operation which involve policy
judgements would be protected by immunity.55
The effect of all this on highway design is not very clear.
Common sense would suggest that highway design is a governm~ntal
function, but the governmental function immunity doctrine does
not always yield to common sense. There are cases holding that
highway design is a governmental function., and others holding
that it is a proprietary function. If there is any majority
view, it may be in favor of the proprietary designation where a
city government is involved, and the opposite where a state is
involved. 56
Design Immunity Statutes
A number of states have incorporated the concept of immunity
for highway design functions into statutory law.57 Typically,
these statutes provide that a government entity is not liable for
55. See the dissent in Thomas YL State Highway Dept. (Mich. 1976)
which argues that the Michigan governmental function immunity
doctrine should be interpreted as if it were a discretionary
function test. This difference is also discussed in the
concurring opinion of Judge wright in Spencer YL General Hospital
(D.C. Cir. 1969)
56. ~ generally Keeton § 131, note 29 and accompanying text
(1984); Shepard's § 2.44 (1982); Thomas v. State Highway Dept.
(Mich. 1976); Knotts v. State (Ind. 1971); Houston v. Glover
(Tex. 1962); Smith v. State (Idaho 1969); Chavez v. Laramie
(Wyo. 1964); Fonseca v. State (Tex. 1957).
57. ~~, Arizona Rev. Stat. § 12-820.03 (Supp. 1984);
California Govt. Code § 830.6 (1980); Idaho Code § 6-904(8)
(1979); Illinois Ann. Stat. ch. 85 § 3-103 (1966) (local
government only); Iowa Code Ann. § 25A.14(8) (Supp. 1985)(state
government), § 6l3A.4(7) (Supp. 1985) (local government); Kansas
Stat. Ann. § 75-6l04(1)(Supp. 1983); ~ generally NCHRP, BR£ BQ
at 28-29 (1975).
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any claim arising out of a plan or design for construction or
improvement of a highway, provided that the plan or design was
prepared in conformity with generally recognized and prevailing
standards in existence at the time the plan was prepared, or that
the plan or design was approved by the legislative body or by
some other body or employee exercising discretionary authority.
Some of the laws require both approval of the plan and conformity
with prevailing standards; some require one or the other. Some
have additional provisions relating to dangerous conditions which
become apparent in use of the highway.
Highway Maintenance
This is the area which is most likely to produce liability.
The highway maintenance function is one for which the protection
of government immunity has traditionally been limited. As in the
prior section on highway design, we will first consider the
standard of conduct applicable to highway maintenance, and then
the matter of governmental immunity.
Standard of Conduct
Just as with highway design, it is generally held that
highway agencies have a duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable
care in highway maintenance. Although the government is not the
insurer of the safety of highway users, it nevertheless must keep
the highways under its control in reasonably safe condition for
the use for which they were intended. The highway agency must
take reasonable measures to inspect for defects and hazards, and
to either alleviate the hazard or to give adequate warning to
highway users so they can protect themselves.58
The measure of what is required to maintain the facility in
reasonably safe condition may be limited by the intended and
lawful use of the facility. For example, a highway agency would
58. ~ Oliver, HRE JJ2 at 124 (1971); NCHRP, BED BQ at 12-14
(1975); NCHRP, R.R.O. U5. (1982).
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not generally have a duty to maintain limited-access highways in
a condition safe for bicycle use because such use is prohibited
by law.59 The duty to maintain the right-hand edge of the roadway
in reasonably safe condition for bicycle travel is somewhat
greater because that is the position generally required for
bicyclists operating on the roadway in most states.60 Therefore,
the highway agency must anticipate that bicyclists will operate
in that position.61 The highway agency is not required to make
the highway safe for a bicyclist who is riding on the wrong side
of the road. There is no requirement to remove or tr im a bush
which creates a visual obstruction at an intersection for a
bicyclist operating on the wrong side, but which creates no such
obstruction for a bicyclist operating on the right side of the
roadway.62
In the same vein, courts in some states hold that roadway
shoulders are intended only for emergency and incidental use, and
must be maintained reasonably safe for that use only.63 Thus it
59. The laws (which generally authorize the state highway
commission to prohibit bicycles on limited-access highways) are
collected in NCUTLO, XLA § 11-313 (1979, Supp. 1983).
60. The laws which require bicyclists to generally keep to the
right on roadways are collected in NCUTLO, XLA § 11-1205 (1979,
Supp. 1983).
61. The law requiring bicyclists to generally keep to the right
side of the roadway is discussed in several cases. ~ DeWaters
v. City of Atlanta (Ga. 1983) ~ Johnson v. State (Alaska 1981) ~
Goldblatt v. State (N.Y. 1979)~ Townsend v. State Department of
Highways (La. 1975)~ Gargano v. Hanington (N.Y. 1972).
62. .s..e..e. Coburn v. City of Tucson (Ariz. 1984).
63. ~ 19 ALR4th 532. Compare McKee v. Dept. of Transportation
(Mich. 1984). In McKee the court concluded that "the shoulders
of a highway are designed for vehicular use and, thus, the state
is obligated to maintain them in reasonable repair so that they
are reasonably safe for their intended use as adjuncts of the
paved portion of the highway." _
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has been held that the government was not negligent when a
bicyclist riding on the shoulder of the roadway slipped and fell
in loose sand which had been spread by the highway agency for
traction and had not yet been removed. The shoulder of the road
is intended for emergency use and not for general travel. Riding
a bicycle on the shoulder is not unlawful, but it is also not the
intended use of the shoulder. The government is only required to
maintain the shoulders as necessary to fulfill their intended
function. 64 The same idea was expressed in a case where the
bicyclist was riding on the sidewalk (in violation of a very old
and never enforced ordinance). The court ruled that the city was
not required to keep its sidewalks safe for bicyclists, but must
keep them reasonably safe for pedestrians.65
When the government becomes aware of a hazardous condition
on a highway, it has a duty to take reasonable action to
alleviate the hazard. In some cases, correcting the problem may
not be feasible. Correction might require extensive repair or
reconstruction, and the application of more resources than the
government has available. Whether or not to undertake a major
corrective project is one of those discretionary, policy-making
decisions so often protected by governmental immunity. On the
other hand, installing a warning or protective device to reduce
the hazard without necessarily correcting the problem is much
more feasible, and much more likely to be required by the
courts. 66
64. Viggiano v. state (N.Y. 1965).
65. Surprisingly, the court rUled that the duty to keep the
sidewalks safe for pedestrians was a duty owed to the bicyclist,
and it was left to the jury to decide whether the ci ty had
breached that duty and whether that breach proximately caused the
injuries. ~ City of Winchester v. Finchum (Tenn. 1957).
66. Dept. of Transportation v. Neilson (Fla. 1982); ~~
Oliver, H.R.R.3...4.1. at 124 (1971).
28
Three recent bicycle cases ~iscuss this duty to warn. Two
of the cases involved highway-railroad crossings, and the third
involved a sewer drain grate. In all three cases, the bicyclists
front wheels were trapped by the devices involved, and the
bicyclists were pitched forward over the handlebars. In all
three cases the courts noted that while a decision to undertake
corrective action (reconstructing the crossings; replacing all of
the city's existing sewer grates) would be a function within the
protection of governmental immunity, the matter of providing
barriers or warning devices was a simple maintenance matter not
protected by immunity. All three courts held that there was a
duty and that the jury could determine the government was
negligent for failing to fulfill it.67
The duty to take reasonable steps to alleviate a hazard
arises only when the responsible highway agency has notice that a
defect exists. Of course where the highway agency itself created
the hazard, notice is assumed. In other cases, the agency will
not be liable for injuries resulting from the hazard unless it
had notice of the existence of the hazard and a reasonable time
following notice in which to alleviate the hazard. The burden of
proving that the agency had notice is on the plaintiff.68
Notice can be either actual or constructive. Actual notice
means that the agency really had knowledge of the hazard, and
that this can be proven in court. Constructive notice is a legal
fiction, a presumption that the agency did have notice because in
the exercise of ordinary diligence it should have had notice.
Constructive notice is often based upon proof that the hazard
existed for a length of time prior to the accident, and a
determination that, given the nature of the hazard, the agency
should have become aware of it in that length of time.
67. DeWaters v. City of Atlanta (Ga. 1983); Reinhart v. Seaboard
Coast Line RR (Fla. 1982); Johnson v. State (Alaska 1981).
68. ~ generally NCHRP, BED ~ at 4-7 (1982); 98 ALR3d 101.
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Some recent bicycle cases il~ustrate different aspects of
the notice problem. One case involved a railroad track crossing
a highway at a severe angle. The injured bicyclist alleged that
the state was negligent in the design of the crossing, in failure
to place signs to warn of the danger, and in failure to properly
maintain the crossing. The trial court held that the state was
not liable because it had no notice of the existence of the
hazard, in spite of evidence that the condition had existed for a
long period of time, that there were numeroUs prior bicycle
accidents at the crossing, and that complaints about the danger
of the crossing for bicyclists had been made to the city manager
and to the railroad, although not to the state highway agency.
The sta te Supreme Court ruled tha t as to the allega tions of
design negligence and failure to erect warning signs, no notice
was required because the state itself created the hazard. As to
the allegation of negligent maintenance, it was for the jury to
determine whether the state had constructive notice of a
maintenance defect.69
In another severe-angle railroad crossing case, the court
had even less trouble finding that the highway agency had notice.
Again there were numerous prior accidents, some reported to the
city or railroad, but apparently not to the state which had
maintenance responsibility. Nevertheless, the plaintiff was able
to show that the state had notice. An interdepartmental memo
from the state highway agency was introduced in evidence. It
recognized the existence of a hazard at the crossing for some
years prior to the accident. It recited that 17 two-wheeled
vehicle accidents had occurred at the crossing in a three-year
period, and noted, "this office deems the current situation as
hazardous."70
A third case involved a bicyclist who was injured by riding
into an uncovered drain hole hidden by weeds and grass at the
edge of the roadway. Evidence showed the cover had been missing
69. Johnson v. State (Alaska 1981).
70. Reinhart v. Seaboard Costs Line RR (Fla. 1982).
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from the hole for at least four months, and that during the four-
month period the highway agency had engaged in grass cutting
operations in the area of the hole. The court found that the
agency had constructive notice.71 Yet another case involved a
depression in the pavement at the side of the roadway caused by
the breaking-away of a piece of concrete. No evidence of the
duration of the defect was shown. Observing that the concrete
piece could have been dislodged by a passing vehicle at any time,
the court ruled that the highway agency had no notice of the
defect and thus no opportunity to repair it prior to the
accident. 72
Just as with highway design, many courts will admit certain
documents as evidence of the standard of conduct which should
apply to highway maintenance operations. We can divide those
documents into three categories, laws, external guidelines, and
internal standards.73
As we noted previously, there are many different federal and
state laws and regulations which are relevant to the matter of
highway design and maintenance. Georgia, for example, has a law
requiring local governments to install bicycle-safe grates
whenever grates are installed at a new location on a roadway,
except on roadways where bicycle traffic is prohibited.74
71. Broussard v. Parish of Jefferson (La. 1979).
72. Goldblatt v. State (N.Y. 1979).
73. ~ generally NCHRP, BEn ~ (1981).
74. Georgia Code Ann. § 36-60-5 (1982). The law applies to all
"newly located grates." This phrase has been construed to apply
only to a grate which is established in a location where there
was not previously a grate, rather than to a grate which has been
adjusted due to a resurfacing of the street. In other words, it
does not require the replacement of any existing grates.
DeWaters v. City of Atlanta (Ga. 1983).
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Where the prov~s~ons of an applicable law or regulations are
mandatory and are intended to protect highway users, as the
provisions of the Georgia bicycle grate law are, a violation by
the highway agency may well constitute negligence ~~. Even
where the provisions are not mandatory, they may provide strong
evidence of the standard of maintenance conduct which should be
required. We already discussed the potential significance of the
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) in this
context.
In the category of external guidelines, we would include all
those safety codes, standards, or guidelines which are sponsored
or issued by government agencies or voluntary associations and
which lack the force of law. As we noted in the earlier
discussion, these documents may be admitted as evidence of the
standard of conduct which should be required for maintenance
operations.
The third category, internal standards, is one we have not
previously discussed. The reference here is to documents which
do not have the status of law, but which are internal to the
highway agency which is charged with negligent maintenance, and
which contain the rules or procedures which the agency applies to
its own maintenance operations. policy manuals or standard
operating procedures (S.Q.P.'s) would be examples. Such
documents have been admitted in several cases.75
Note that all of these documents are two-edged swords. For
example, the highway agency's S.Q.P's may be admitted in evidence
to show that the agency failed to comply with its own maintenance
,procedures, which would be strong evidence of negligence. But
the same S.Q.P.' s can also be used to show that the agency did
follow its procedures, which can be strong evidence that the
agency used reasonable care. The importance of compliance with
all applicable laws, regulations, internal procedures, and
significant external guidelines is clear.
75. See the discussion and the cases cited at NCHRP, BEn~ at
14 (1981).
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Governmental Immunity
Although there are exceptions, the rule in most states is
that highway maintenance operations are not protected by
governmental immunity.
One interesting exception to this statement comes from a
case regarding alleged negligent maintenance of a bicycle path.
The path was under the jurisdiction of the city park and
recreation board. That board enjoyed a special statutory
immunity for claims of negligence arising out of its operation of
a system of pUblic recreation facilities and playgrounds. The
injured bicyclist was unable to recover.76
Discretionary Function Immunity
As previously noted, the most common pattern in governmental
immunity is the distinction between discretionary and ministerial
functions. The former are protected by immunity while the latter
are not.
In jurisdictions where governmental immunity is based on
this distinction, it is always held that highway maintenance
operations are ministerial in nature and are not protected by
government immuni ty.77
76. Grosz v. City of Sioux Falls (S.D. 1984).
77. ~~ Stevenson v. State Department of Transportation
(Ore. 1980); ~ generally NCHRP, BEn BD at 32-35 (1975);
Shepard's § 2.50 (1982). Several bicycle cases illustrate the
same rule. ~ Bjorkquist v. City of Robbinsdale (Minn. 1984);
DeWaters v. City of Atlanta (Ga. 1983); Reinhart v. Seaboard
Coast Line RR (Fla. 1982).
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Governmental Function Immunity
Under this pattern of immunity, also previously discussed in
detail, functions which are governmental in nature are immune,
while functions which are proprietary in nature are not immune.
This distinction has its primary application in the law of
immunity of municipal corporations.
Common sense would suggest that highway maintenance is a
governmental function, but as we noted before, common sense has
little application to the law of governmental function immunity.
Many cases hold that highway maintenance is a proprietary
function, not protected by governmental immunity; others find
that highway maintenance is an immune governmental function.78
A rUling that highway maintenance is a proprietary function
appears to reflect a sense that it is just and proper to hold the
highway agency liable for negligent maintenance in spite of the
immunity law. Such rUlings may also reflect the intrusion of
discretionary-function-immunity analysis into the governmental-
function-immunity area.
Other Basis of Liability
Two more aspects of the highway liability picture need to be
discussed, waiver of immunity statutes, and highway defect
statutes. The waiver statutes allow the injured plaintiff to
proceed with a negligence action. The highway defect statutes
create a special remedy for the person injured by a hazardous
condition on the highway.
Waiver of Immunity statutes
Quite a few states now have statutory provisions waiving
governmental immunity to some extent. These laws would apply to
cases arising out of injuries due to the hazardous condition of a
78. ~ generally Shepard's § 2.44 (1982); ~~ City of
Winchester v. Finchum (Tenn. 1957) (a bicycle case).
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highway, and would allow the injured plaintiff to proceed with a
negligence action. Beyond that, they have little in common.
Here are brief descriptions of a few examples:
Maryland and Colorado have provisions which specifically
waive immunity for injuries resulting from hazardous conditions
on the highways. The Maryland law covers "a defective, unsafe,
or dangerous condition" of a highway, provided that the state or
local agency which controls the highway had either constructive
or actual notice of the condition. The Colorado law covers "a
dangerous condition which interferes with the movement of
traffic" on a roadway, shoulder, curb, or sidewalk. Both laws
include a maximum allowable claim; above the specified limit,
immunity is not waived.79
Florida and Idaho have provisions which waive immunity for
tort claims generally. Both include a maximum allowable claim.
The laws also include notice requirements, time limitations, and
administrative claims procedures which must be complied with as a
prerequisite to bringing an action in court. 80
Delaware and Georgia have provisions which simply waive
immunity for any claim which would be covered by the state's
insurance program. The Georgia provision, which is in the state
Constitution, waives immunity only to the extent of the coverage,
but the Delaware law does not impose any maximum.8l
Because these laws generally waive immunity, they would
allow actions based on negligence at the planning and design
level as well as at the operational or maintenance level, unless
some other law provides otherwise. As we already noted, one of
these states, Idaho, also has a design immunity statute.
79. Maryland Code Ann. § 12-104 (1984); Colorado Rev. Stat.
§ 24-10-106 (1982).
80. Florida Stat. Ann. § 768.28 (1984); Idaho Code §§ 6-903 to
6-926 (Supp. 1985).
81. Delaware Code Ann. tit. 18 § 6511 (1975); Georgia
Con s tituti on , Art. 1, § 2, '1 _~_( 1 982) •
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Highway Defect statutes
Some states have adopted statutes which provide a separate
cause of action for injuries resulting from hazardous highway
conditions instead of waiving immunity and allowing a negligence
action to proceed. The statutory cause of action created by
these laws looks a lot like a negligence action, in most cases,
but it is an action based entirely in the statute and is not a
negligence action. Most of the defect statutes specify the
standard of conduct which the government is required to maintain,
and the remedy for an injury resulting from a failure to maintain
that standard.
Some of these laws have been around for a long time. They
represent one of the earliest intrusions of liability into the
concept of governmental immunity. Many of them are limited in
terms of the defects covered.
For example, in a 1963 case, a bicylist tried to recover
under a highway defect statute which required the town to keep
its highways, "[I]n repair and amended, from time to time, so
that the same may be safe and convenient for travelers with their
teams, carts and carriages at all seasons of the year •••n The
court held that the town was not required to keep its highways
safe for bicyclist~, but only for teams, carts, and carriages. 82
Below are brief descriptions of several examples of the
highway defect laws:
Connecticut law provides that a person injured through the
neglect or default of the state or its employees by means of any
defective highway, bridge, or sidewalk, which it is the duty of
the state to keep in repair, or by reason of the absence of a
railing or fence on the side of a bridge or elevated roadway, may
bring a civil action for damages. The law imposes a time limit
and certain procedural requirements. Another section provides
for a similar cause of action against local governments. 83
82. Ferretti v. Ber-ry (R.I. 1963).
83. Connecticut Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ l3a-144, -149 (Supp. 1985).
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Massachusetts law provides that the state is liable for
injuries sustained by a person traveling on state highways if
they are caused by defects within the limits of the "constructed
traveled roadway," except for injuries caused by the lack of a
railing on the highway, injuries sustained on a sidewalk, or
injuries sustained during construction or repair of the highway.
The law limits the amount which can be recovered to, "one-fifth
of one percent of the valuation of the town in which the injury
was received" or $4,000, whichever is less.84
Michigan has a highway defect law which requires the
government entity with control over a highway to maintain it in
reasonable repair so it is reasonably safe and convenient for
public travel. A person injured by a failure to comply with this
duty can recover damages. The ~aw specifies that the duty of
state and county governments does not apply to sidewalks. The
government entity is not liable for injuries caused by a defect
unless the entity knew or should have known about the defect and
had a reasonable time to repair it before the injury occurred.
Knowledge of the defect and time to repair it is conclusively
presumed if the defect existed so as to be readil!' apparent for a
period of 30 days or more prior to the accident.8
California has an extensive law which is in the nature of a
highway defect law, though it covers much more than highways.
The basic provision specifies that a public entity is liable for
injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property (including
highways) if the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous
condition, if the condition created a reasonable foreseeability
of the kind of injury which occurred, and either that the
84. Massachusetts Gen. Laws ch. 81 § 18 (1958). Massachusetts
also has a statute which incorporates the discretionary function
immunity test, and provides for liability as to ministerial
functions. Mass. Gen. Law, ch. 258 §§ 1-10 (1958, Supp. 1985).
85. Michigan stat. Ann. §§ 3.996 (102), 3.996 (103) (1977).
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condition was caused by a negligent or wrongful act or omission
of an employee of the public entity acting within the scope of
employment, or that the public entity had actual or constructive
notice of the condition and adequate time to protect against it.
The law also defines what constitutes a dangerous condition. 86
Liability to Bicyclists on Highway
At this point we need to step back and assess just what a~l
this means with respect to bicyclists now operating on the
highways. To what extent is the highway agency potentially
liable to bicyclists using the highways? The answer is that the
liab.ility situation for bicyclists is the same as it is for other
highway users.
That bicyclists have the right to use the highways is a rule
so long and so well established that most modern cases don't even
discuss the question. It was resolved even before the advent of
the automobile.87 Modern cases simply accept without comment that
the bicyclist is entitled to be on the highway.
In unusual circumstances, the court may comment on the
matter. In one recent case, a bicyclist was on a multi-laned
highway with a 55 mph speed limit and was moving into the left
lane (apparently preparing for a left turn) when struck and
killed. At the trial, the defendant asserted a defense called
the "choice of paths" rule, a variant on the assumption of risk
defense. In holding that the defense had no application in this
case, the court noted that the bicyclist was legally on the
highway and had a right to be there.88
86. California Govt. Code § 835; ~ generally §§ 830 to 840
(1980). This law was analyzed in a bicycle case where the court
found no evidence of the existence of a dangerous condition. ~
Mittenhuber v. Herrera (Cal. 1983).
87. See.~ Holland v. Bartch (Ind. 1889); Thompson v. Dodge
(Minn. 1894); City of Chicago v. Collins (111.1898).
88. Parnell v. Taylor (Pa. 1979).
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In a similar case where the defendant's dog bit the
bicyclist, the defendant attempted to assert the assumption of
risk defense. The defendant argued that the bicyclist knew the
dog was vicious and was allowed to run loose, and assumed the
risk of being bitten by riding on the street in front of the
defendant's house. The court rejected the argument, noting that
the bicyclist had a legal right to ride on a pUblic street, and
that the law does not require a person to surrender a valuable
right because of another person's negligence. 89
We have already discussed the somewhat unusual New York case
in which the bicyclist was injured while riding on the shoulder,
and the court held that the only proper riding posi tion was on
the roadway.90
The right of bicyclists to use the highway and roadway is
also a part of the statutory traffic laws, the rules of the road,
of every state. All have provisions specifically regulating
bicycle traffic to some extent. Most of the states also define a
bicycle as a "vehicle,n and many also have a specific provision
to the effect that bicyclists on the roadway have the same rights
and duties as the drivers of other vehicles.91
Since bicyclists have a clearly established right to use the
highways, it follows that the government entity which controls
the highway owes the same duty to bicyclists as to other highway
users. That duty is to exercise ordinary and reasonable care to
provide highways which are reasonably safe for their users.
89. Bell v. Chawkins (Tenn. 1970).
90. Viggiano v. State (N.Y. 1965).
91. These laws are collected in various sections of NCUTLO, ~
(1979, Supp. 1983).
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As in all cases, the precise standard of conduct which this
duty entails varies with the circumstances. In assessing the
circumstances, the following bicycle-specific factors must be
considered:
First, bicycles have greater susceptibility to certain
roadway conditions than some other vehicles. Thus potholes and
other openings in the roadway, drainage grates, railroad tracks,
pavement expansion joints, manhole covers, steel construction
cover plates, oil slicks, wet pavement, ice and snow, loose sand
or gravel, broken glass and other debris, broken or uneven
pavement edges, a drop-off between the roadway and the gutter or
shoulder, and many other factors, all of which might have little
impact on the passage of most traffic, can constitute serious
hazards for bicycles.
Second, bicycle presence and position on a roadway is
somewhat predictable, due to a number of factors. Bicycles are
prohibited by law on some roadways, and this is certainly a
factor which affects the standard of conduct applicable to that
roadway. On the other hand, heavy bicycle traffic may be
anticipated on certain roadways for a number of reasons,
including the possibility that the roadway has been designated as
a bike route. Furthermore, bicycle position on the roadway is
somewhat predictable. As a general rUle, due to legal
requirements in most states, and undoubtedly also due to
bicyclist's fear or respect for the heavier motorized traffic on
the roadway, most bicycle travel takes place near the right edge
of the roadway. Also, bicycles are often trapped in that
position by other traffic and cannot maneuver around hazards.
Because bicycles often ride at the right edge of the roadway, the
highway agency must anticipate bicycle traffic in this position.
These are realities which may contribute, in a particular
case, to defining the appropriate standard of conduct which the
highway agency owed the bicyclist.
A word of caution is perhaps in order. Just because most
bicycle traffic on a ,particular street is positioned near the
right edge of the roadway does not mean that a highway agency
would not be held liable for a dangerous drainage grate in some
other position. It simply means that a greater degree of care
will be required with respect to hazards at the right edge of the
roadway.
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Even the fact that bicycles are prohibited on a particular
roadway does not relieve the highway agency from its duty to
bicyclists who ride there. Such a prohibition, if clearly
signed, would be a factor in determining the standard of care
which the highway agency owed to the bicyclists, but not the only
factor. For example, if there is significant bicycle traffic on
the roadway in spite of the prohibition, the standard of care
owed by the highway agency might well be the same as it would be
without the prohibition. The violation by the bicyclist might
(or might not) be considered contributory negligence, but the
duty of the highway agency would be unaffected by the violation.
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Liability Relating to Bikeways
Having assessed the liability of highway agencies to highway
users, including bicyclists, who are injured while using the
highways, we can finally turn our attention to the central issue.
How does the designation of a facility especially for bicycle use
affect the liability picture?
We will first briefly discuss what bikeways are, and how
they are designated as such. Then we will deal with the
questions regarding liability which were presented in the
introduction.
Bikeway Designation
We are not going to attempt to reinvent the wheel here. The
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices contains a chapter
dealing with "bicycle facilities." It defines five different
kinds of bicycle facilities as follows: 92
1. Bikeway--Any road, street, path, or way which
in some manner is specifically designated as being
open to bicycle travel, regardless of whether such
facilities are designated for the exclusive use of
bicycles or are to be shared with other transportation
modes.
2. Bicycle Trail--A separate trail or path from
which motor vehicles are prohibited and which is for
the exclusive use of bicycles or the shared use of
bicycles and pedestrians. Where such trail or path
forms a part of a highway, it is separated from the
roadways for motor vehicle traffic by an open space or
barrier.
92. FHWA, MUTCD Part IX (1978).
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3. Designated Bicycle Lane--A portion of a roadway
or shoulder which has been designated for use by
bicyclists. It is distinguished from the portion of
the roadway for motor vehicle traffic by a paint
stripe, curb, or other similar device.
4. Shared Roadway--A roadway which is officially
designated and marked as a bicycle route, but which is
open to motor vehicle travel and upon which no bicycle
lane is designated.
5. Bicycle Route--A system of bikeways designated
by appropriate route markers, and by the jurisdiction
having authority.
To provide additional clarification, the following two
definitions are needed:
Bighway--The entire width between the boundary
lines of every way publicly maintained when any part
thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes
of vehicular travel. 93
Roadway--That portion of a highway improved,
designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel,
exclusive of the berm or shoulder. In the event a
highway includes two or more separate roadways the
term 'roadway' as used herein shall refer to any such
roadway separately but not to all such roadways
collectively.94
93. NCUTLO, DYe § 1-122 (1968). The UVC definitions are
incorporated by reference by MUTeD § lA-9.
94. FHWA, MUTCD § lA-9 (1978). The Manual contains its own
definition of 'roadway.' The UVC definition is the same except
that the exclusion clause reads as follows: n[E]xclusive of the
sidewalk, berm or shoulder even though such sidewalk, berm or
shoulder is used by persons riding bicycles or other human
powered vehicles.n NCUTLO, DYe § 1-158 (Supp. 1984).
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These definitions constitute a quite adequate explanation of
bicycle facilities. There are several different kinds, with the
term "bikeway" encompassing all the others. Some bikeways are
located on existing highways or roadways; a "bicycle trail" may
be separate from existing highways, however. Some bikeways mix
bicycle and motor vehicle traffic; others provide for some degree
of separation of the traffic.
The matter of a bikeway being separate from an existing
highway needs further consideration. Is it possible to have a
bicycle facility which is not itself a highway? The question is
very important because the traffic laws of all the states are
generally applicable only on the "highways," and some duties
apply only to a person on a "roadway." If a bikeway which is
separate from an existing highway is not itself a highway, then
the traffic laws of the.state would not apply on that bikeway.
Many people may believe that a trail owned and maintained by a
park department, for example, is not a highway because highways
are under the control and maintenance of the highway department.
Such reasoning is erroneous. A highway must be publicly
maintained, but it matters not what government agency has that
responsibility.
Definitions of "highway" and "roadway" which conform
substantially with those set out above are part of the traffic
laws of many states.95 Also, as previously noted, many states
define the term "vehicle" to include bicycles. Given these
definitions, a bikeway which is publicly maintained and open to
the use of the public for bicycle (vehicular) travel is a
highway. The paved or improved portion of that bikeway which is
normally used for bicycle travel would be a roadway.
95. The laws are collected in NCUTLO, ~ §§ 1-122, -158 (1979,
Supp. 1983).
. .
44
The last question which needs to be addressed in this
section relates to how bikeways get designated as such. What is
the procedure by which a facility becomes a "designated" bikeway?
There are many ways in which a bikeway could be designated.
The most obvious is by erecting signs which announce that the
facility is for bicycles. But who can put up such signs and what
kind of signs should they be? A private group which wishes to
encourage bicycle commuting may print and distribute a map on
which they have identified certain streets as "bicycle commuter
routes." Would this constitute designation? The state highway
commission may act officially, through an order entered on its
minutes, to declare a particular highway to be a bikeway, but if
they do not erect signs to identify the bikeway, would this
constitute designation? Would it matter if they had their
minutes pUblished in several newspapers?
The matter of how a bikeway should be designated is not our
primary concern here, but we offer these brief observations.
Obviously some official action should be taken by the controlling
agency. It is hard to conceive of that not happening given the
fact that public funds would be expended in creating the bikeway.
Whatever legislation controls the funding will probably also
control the designated use of the facility. It is also clear
that the designation should be implemented by the installation of
traffic control devices, signs, signals, and markings, to guide,
warn, and regulate the traffic using the trail. Official devices
described in the MUTCD should be used for this purpose. Given
the existing legal status of the MUTCD, that may well be required
for most projects.
Our concern with how bikeways are designated is with the
liability issue, and more specifically with the liability of the
government entity which controls and maintains the bikeway. An
identification of recommended routes or "bikeways" by a private
group, such as a bicycle club, would not constitute a designation
of a bikeway which would affect the liability of the government
entity with control of the recommended facility. It is possible
but unlikely that the private group itself would be liable for
the negligent recommendation of a hazardous route, but the issues
involved in that question of liability differ significantly from
those which we are discussing here.
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Only a designation by the government entity which has
responsibility for the bikeway will have any potential impact on
liability~ The only kind of designation which may be significant
is one which gives notice to the public that the facili ty is open
for bicycles, and which invites or encourages such bicycle use,
especially if it includes a claim that the bikeway is safe. This
matter will be discussed extensively in the next section.
Discussion of the Issues
It is now possible to discuss the three questions posed in
the Introduction, and to offer some answers.
1. Bow does designation of a bikeway affect the potential
liability of the governmental entity which controls the facility?
It is our opinion that designation of a bicycle facility
will have virtually no effect on the potential liability of the
government entity which controls the facility.
That conclusion may seem surprising. We are not suggesting
that there is no liability involved with bikeways. Ouite the
contrary is true. What we do conclude is that the liability
already exists. It exists with respect to bicyclists who are
injured as a result of hazardous conditions on the highways. The
standard of conduct required of the government entity with
respect to a bicyclist on a bikeway does not differ significantly
from the standard of conduct already required of the government
entity with respect to bicyclists on the highways. On balance,
the potential liability should be the same for bicyclists on
bikeways or highways.
Obviously, our conclusion takes a broad governmental
perspective. From the standpoint of particular government
agencies, designation of bikeways may affect potential liability
by shifting it from one agency to another. Thus, for example, if
the park department designates a system of bikeways on land under
its jurisdiction, bicycle traffic may be shifted from the
highways onto the bikeways, and some potential liability may be
shifted from the highway department to the park department,
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although from a broad governmental perspective potential
liability remains unchanged. This should not be a serious
problem for agencies for two reasons. First, most bikeways are
designated on existing highways, so there is no shifting of
liability. Second, as we will discuss below, it is possible
through an appropriate risk management program to minimize
bikeway liability, keeping it at an acceptable level.
It is important to distinguish two areas of potential
liability in regard to a bikeway designation. First, there is
potential liability for negligent designation or design. Second,
there is potential liability for defects or hazardous conditions
on the designated route. Each of these requires some discussion.
A claim of negligent designation or design might be based
upon an allegation that a dangerous route was selected, or that
the facility was improperly designed. This kind of claim is not
likely to be successful. It questions governmental decisions
which involve the exercise of discretion and policy judgement at
the planning level. Such decisions are still protected by
governmental immunity in most jurisdictions. Where the route
selection and the design plans were approved by the appropriate
legislative or administrative body (the city councilor the
highway board, for example) or by a high-level administrative
official, it is most unlikely that the courts will find
negligence. This is often referred to as "design immunity."
Design immunity is not absolute, however. If the government
acted to approve the design or route selection in an arbitrary
manner, or if the design or route was so clearly defective that
no reasonable person could approve it, then it is not immune to
judicial scrutiny. A bikeway which clearly did not conform to
bikeway design standards which were contemporary at the time the
bikeway was designed will probably not be protected by design
immuni ty in spi te of the fact tha t the plans were approved by the
highway board.
It is also important that the particular aspect of the
design or route selection which is alleged to be negligent was
approved. The city council may have approved the route and the
design for the bike lane on main street, but if nothing in the
design plans or the council's deliberations refers to the
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parallel-bar sewer grates which are in the road where the bike
lane will be, then design immunity will not cover that aspect of
the bike lane, and the city may well be liable to a bicyclist
injured by that hazard.
The second area of potential liability is for defects or
hazardous conditions on the designated route. A claim of this
type, which alleges negligent maintainence or failure to warn of
a hazard, is more likely to succeed. It questions governmental
decisions at the operational level which are generally not
protected by governmental immunity.
Examples of conditions which could be the basis of a
negligent maintentance claim would include a failure to remove
loose gravel or a fallen tree limb, to fill in a pothole, or to
replace or repair a missing or malfunctioning traffic-control
device. The government agency must have notice of the condition
before there is any duty to correct it, but notice will be
presumed when the condition has existed for such a period of time
that the agency should have known about it.
Hazardous conditions can also arise out of design factors
which would normally be protected by design immunity. For
example, a bikeway which was reasonably safe when it was designed
may be rendered hazardous by changed traffic conditions. It may
also be that the bikeway was poorly designed and was always
hazardous. In either case, design immunity will not protect the
government from liability in perpetuity. The government cannot
ignore a continuing and unusual record of accidents on a bikeway
evidencing that it is hazardous in actual operation. Once the
government has notice that a hazardous condition exists, it has a
duty to take r~asonable steps to alleviate it.
Just what is the government required to do to alleviate the
hazard? The courts are unlikely to find the agency negligent for
failing to make a major renovation or reconstruction of the
bikeway to correct the problem. That kind of action would
invariably involve a high-level policy decision, a discretionary
function. What the courts will generally require is corrective
action of the type which can be undertaken at the operational
level, the kind of work which can be performed by the agency's
maintenance department. The primary obligation would be to give
warning of the hazardous condition to persons using the bikeway.
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All of this suggests that there certainly is potential
liability associated with bikeways, especially in the area of
maintenance operations. Is this potential liability the same as
that which the government already bears with respect to bicycles
operating on the highway? Does the government's responsibility
for maintenance and hazard removal increase when a facility is
designated as a bikeway? Is the government more likely to be
found liable for an injury which occurs on a designated bikeway
than for the same occurrence on a non-designated facility?
We believe there is no significant increase in liability
associated with bikeway designation. That is, assuming we have
two highways, one including a designated bikeway, and the other
without a designated bikeway, with both carrying the same amount
of bicycle traffic and all other factors being equal, the
potential liability of the government and the maintenance
responsibility would be the same for both.
The question with respect to maintenance responsibility
should be viewed from both a practical and a legal perspective.
We noted earlier that bicycles have greater susceptibility than
other vehicles to certain roadway conditions. That fact should
receive consideration in maintenance operations on any highway
which carries bicycle traffic, and certainly on any designated
bikeway. From a practical viewpoint, that is probably more
likely to be done on bikeways than on non-designated highways,
even those which carry a significant volume of bicycle traffic.
If that is true, some people might conclude that designating a
bikeway results in increased maintenance responsibility. A more
correct conclusion in that case would be that current maintenance
practices on facilities which are not specifically designated for
bicycles are inadequate, exposing the government to unnecessary
risk of liability.
From a legal perspective, maintenance responsibility on a
bikeway is the same as on any highway carrying similar bicycle
traffic. The primary legal impact of designating a bikeway lies
with its potential for focusing bicycle traffic to a particular
location. The duty of the government to maintain the way in
reasonably safe condition for bicycle traffic is somewhat greater
where bicycle traffic can be anticipated. Certainly that would
be true for a bikeway. It may, however, be equally true for any
other highway carrying bicycle traffic even though it is not a
designated facility.
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With respect to the overall liability question, there are
factors involved with bikeway designation which appear to
increase potential liability, but there are other factors which
appear to decrease it. The perception that designated routes
have been so designated because they are safer than other
possible routes, and the fact that designated bikeways may invite
and encourage bicycle use are factors which may add to liability.
On the other hand, risk of liability can be more easily
controlled on designated bikeways than on the highway system as a
whole. When appropriate criteria are used for route selection,
and care is taken to eliminate bicycle hazards on the route, the
risk of liability could be significantly reduced on the bikeway.
Further, designation of a bikeway can result in some diminished
responsibility for adjacent roadways because of the reasonable
expectation that bicycle traffic will use a safe and well
maintained bikeway in lieu of the adjacent roadway which carries
mixed traffic. On balance, designation of bikeways may have more
potential for decreasing than for increasing liability.
The number of reported judicial opinions relating to
government liability for bikeway injuries is very small. We have
found one case where the fact that a bikeway designation was made
was considered by the court on the issue of the bicyclist's
contributory negligence. Given the facts of the case, it is
surprising that the bikeway designation was not much more
damaging to the government's case. It should have been. The
bicyclist's front wheel dropped into a drainage grate located in
the curb lane of a roadway which had been designated as a bicycle
path. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant city
on the grounds that the plaintiff bicyclist was contributorily
negligent in failing to see the grate and avoid it. The appeals
court reversed and remanded for a new trial, noting as follows:
But here we have a situation where the Plaintiff
had no prior knowledge, warning, or notice that any
permanent part of the roadway was dangerous to bicycle
traffic. Indeed, the City had designated the area in
question as a bicycle path, and had erected a sign so
stating in very close proximity to the dangerous sewer
grate itself. Certainly reasonable men could differ
as to whether an ordinarily careful person would rely
upon the sign and bicycle path designation, and
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perforce, in his or her mind's eye, not measure the
spacing of the grids in the sewer grate in relation to
the width of a bicycle tire. 9C
In several cases the courts have noted in their decisions
that the roadway on which the bicyclist was injured was nQt
designated as a bikeway. The fact was unimportant in the
resolution of each case, but such comments could be interpreted
to mean that the judges would have considered such a designation
significant had there been one.97
2. What impact do the various laws, regulations, guidelines,
and standards relating to bikeways have on the government
entity's potential liability?
The impact of such documents can be very significant, either
as a positive or a negative factor. They are often admissible in
court as evidence of the standard of conduct which should be
applied to the government entity in the design, construction,
operation, or maintenance of highways and bikeways. Laws and
regulations with mandatory requirements can serve as a basis for
a finding of negligence ~ ~ if the mandate has been violated.
If the government entity has complied with the requirements
and recommendations established in these documents, that will be
strong evidence that the government has met the required standard
of conduct and is not negligent. The opposite will be true if
the government entity has failed to comply with the requirements
and recommendations. Obviously it is important for each agency
to identify all relevant documents of this type, to assess which
are important to that particular agency, and to assure that
compliance is maintained.
96. City of Albuquerque v. Redding (N.M. 1980) at 1159.
97. DeWaters v. City of Atlanta (Ga. 1983) at 233; Johnson v.
State (Alaska 1981) at 54.
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One of the most important of these documents is the Manual
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). As we noted in
earlier discussion, the MUTCD has been adopted as a national
standard by the federal government. It has some legal status in
every state, and has been adopted, either directly by statute or
by regulatory action, as the state standard in many states. The
MUTCD contains a chapter dealing with traffic controls for
bicycle facilities. 98 It contains extensive provisions regarding
signs, markings, and signals used on bicycle facilities.
Although most of the provisions are not mandatory, a few are.
For example, MUTCD provides that overhead sign clearance on
bicycle trails shall be a minimum of 8.5 feet. 99 It provides that
markings shall be reflectorized on bicycle trails. IOO
There are a number of state and federal laws which specify a
standard or require development of a standard for the design and
construction of bikeways. For example, the federal regulation
which provides for bicycle accomodations on federal-aid highway
projects specifies that either AASHTO, Guide ~ Development Qf
~ Bicycle Facilities (1981), or equivalent guides developed in
cooperation with state or local officials and acceptable to the
division office of the Federal Highway Administration, shall be
used as standards for the construction and design of bicycle
routes. IOI
Examples of state laws include the following: Florida law
requires the state DOT to establish construction standards and a
uniform system of signing for bicycle and pedestrian ways.I02
Delaware and Iowa have similar laws which specify that bicycle
routes shall be clearly marked with appropriate signs to guide
98. FHWA, MUTCD Part IX (1978).
99. ~ at § 9B-2.
100. ~ at § 9C-2.
101. 23 C.F.R. § 652.13 (1985).
102. Florida Stat. Ann. § 335.064 (Supp. 1984).
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cyclists and to alert motorists. The signs are to be placed at
intervals and designed in such form as prescribed by the state
DOT. The laws also specify that the routes shall be designed to
maximize the safety of cyclists and motorists.103 The California
bikeway law requires the state DOT to establish recommended
minimum general design criteria for the development, planning,
and construction of bikeways, including but not limited to, the
design speed, space requirements, minimum widths and clearances,
grade, radius of curves, surface, lighting, drainage, and general
safety.104
There are also a number of safety codes, guidelines, or
standards which are developed by private organizations or by
government agencies. These documents lack any partiCUlar legal
status, but can provide evidence of the standard of conduct which
should be required in any particular case.
3. What can the government entity do to reduce the potential
liability related to bikeway designation?
The single most important step which any government entity
can take to reduce potential liability is to reduce accidents.
The primary goal should not be to avoid liability but to control
the risk of injury to highway users. The time for hiding behind
the protection of governmental immunity is past.
The transportation system should provide for the safe and
efficient movement of a variety of different personal mobility
options, including bicycles and automobiles, among others. Where
that system fails and a user is injured as a result, compensation
should be provided. Reform in the legal system in the past few
decades has moved in the direction of breaking down barriers to
103. Delaware Code Ann. §§ 1001, 1002 (1975); Iowa Code Ann.
§ 308A.l (Supp. 1985).
104. California street & Hgwy Code § 2374 (Supp. 1985).
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the compensation of the injured. One result of that reform is
that government ,entities are encountering an ever increasing
problem with liability. It will be most unfortunate if undue
fear of governmental liability impedes desirable progress in the
transportation system.
Some liability will be encountered. Proper insurance
coverage or budgeting for self-insurance to cover potential
liability will do much to alleviate undue concern. A competent
risk management program will help to assure that the government
enti ty is doing all that it can to be responsible stewards of the
public treasury.lOS The following are some specific suggestions
for managing the liability risk associated with bikeways:
1. It is very important that route selection and bikeway
design conform to acceptable standards. Careful compliance with
applicable laws, regulations, route selection criteria, and
design standards should greatly reduce the risk of injury to
bicyclists using the bikeway, and thus also the risk of
liability. Compliance with such standards also provides strong
evidence that the agency used reasonable care. Even if a
particular city or state government agency is not required to
build bikeways to any particular standards, that agency should
identify the best prevailing standards and comply with them.
2. Maintenance operations should also conform to acceptable
standards. The maintenance department should have written
procedures to follow in maintaining all highways in reasonably
safe condition for bicycle traffic. Certain conditions are known
to endanger bicycle traffic. It is very important that all such
bicycle hazards be removed, especially from bikeways. The case
discussed earlier in which a non-bicycle-safe drain grate was
left in the curb lane of a roadway designated as a bikeway
represents an incredible lapse in risk management. If a hazard
cannot be removed, it must be protected with barriers or, at
least, clear warning signs must be installed.
lOS. ~~ NCHRP, ~ lQ[ (1983).
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3. The actual experience with bicycle traffic on all
highways, and especially on bikeways, should be monitored. Even
when the bikeway design is absolutely in compliance with the best
available standards, if the bikeway proves hazardous in actual
operation, the government must take reasonable steps to alleviate
the hazard. Regular inspections of bikeways by maintenance
personnel trained to identify bicycle hazards should be made.
All reports of hazardous conditions received from bikeway users,
police, or other government agencies should be thoroughly
investigated. Reports of accidents involving bicycle traffic
should be reviewed and the site investigated to determine whether
a hazardous condition exists.
4. Written records of all of these activities should be
made. The fact that the agency took appropriate action in
response to a hazardous-condition report, or the fact that the
maintenance department makes regular bikeway inspections, will
avail not at all unless the agency can prove it with a written
record in court a decade or more later. Such written records
must be more than informal notes kept by one or more agency
employees. The records should be part of a formal record-keeping
structure designed to chronicle all of the agencies activities
which may later be significant in a liability action. The
records should be dated and signed by the person making the
record and by an appropriate supervisor.
5. The agency should carefully avoid making statements that
a designated bikeway is "safe," or that it is "safer" than some
non-designated route. We have already noted that there may be a
pre-existing pUblic perception that bikeways are designated
because they are safer than other routes, and that this
perception may increase potential liability. That perception
should not be augmented by additional safety claims. We are
aware of a number of bikeway system maps which make this mistake.
They contain statements that the routes were selected for
bicyclist safety, or that use of the designated routes is
recommended for safety. Some maps even classify routes for
different cyclist skill levels. These maps are often produced by
the agency which controls and maintains the bikeways. Statements
such as these open the door to a different basis for liability
claims, and introduce an element of risk which is difficult to
quantify. Such statements should not be made.
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with careful attention to risk management, we believe that
designation of bikeways will not increase the potential liability
of government entities. It is even feasible that a carefully
implemented bikeway program could reduce injuries to bicyclists
on highways and actually result in an overall reduction in
liability experience.
+ +
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